Introduction
Today's organisations engage multiple diverse formats in operating across the more mature interconnected markets (Clarke, 2015 , Knyght et al., 2011a , which are characterized by the competing pressures of integrated governmental policies 1 and strategic business decentralisations 2 (Chandler, 1962) . Whilst the focus of institutional governance is on building risk-resilience capacities against volatile and chaotic market impacts (Kakabadse, 2015; Boussebaa et al., 2012) , the firm leadership priority remains more towards How board should be structured and engaged to achieve better investor value (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) from their committees and top-team members (Filatotchev & Dotsenko, 2015 , Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015 Krause et al., 2014) . But the narrowly conceived Freeman et al., 2007) shorter-term institution-firm relationships reorientation has yet to effectively address the longer-term policy-strategy sustainability 3 concern as supporting societal value (Bouglet et. al., 2016; Parker &Tamaschke, 2005; Griffin & Mahone, 1997) .
The wide impact of cyclical economic crisis (Shularick & Taylor, 2009; Schumpeter, 1934) is not new to the advanced Anglo-Saxon market 4 . Examples include the post-Napoleonic depression (1812-1821), the Panic of 1857, the Long Depression (1873-96), the oil crisis of the 1970s and Black Monday in 1987. However, the combined effects of exclusive government (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2016) , low political engagement (Political Info, 2014) , voluntary regulation (Elshandidy et al., 2015) , potential distancing from the EU (UK referendum, 2016) and ever-creative neo-liberalisms (Kinderman, 2012; Heyes et al., 2012) all place the greater burden of this shared responsibility onto the shoulders of leadership in UK-based firms, i.e. firm strategy. An extensive global research of leadership teams/Boards demonstrates that "Boards within the U.K. are more often aware of the challenges, but do not adequately address them" (Kakabadse, 2014) . Therefore, in this governance environment, the focus of attention has to be on improving Board effectiveness.
Organisational leadership studies have typically focused on the Chairman-CEO relationship (Kakabadse et al.,2006; 2010; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Dalton & Daily, 1997) . As a result of the 2007 financial crisis ( Van Essen et al., 2013; Knyght et al., 2011b ) the Non-Executive Director 5 role in the UK attracted 3 A greater equitable balance by leaderships between social, environmental and economic outcomes -more than just economic. 4 The UK ranks 1st in the Soft Power List -see http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking orhttp://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report_Final-published.pdf. 5 Similar to after the Hong-Kong Financial Crash -see Gul and Leung, 2004. considerable attention (McNulty et al., 2013; Kirkpartick, 2009 Clearly, the current developmental need is for all top-team leadership members to have greater incisive discretionary professionalism and better team alignment (Kakabadse, 2015; Kakabadse & Van den Berghe, 2013 , Kakabadse et al., 2009 ) for managing change (Tushman et al., 1986) , whilst also meeting the evolving regulatory demand for transparent accountability (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; Financial Reporting Council, 2014) to their wider stakeholders (Solas, 2016; Beau, 2016) .
Discretion gives the power or right to make official decisions using reason and judgment in choosing from acceptable alternatives. In Public Office, executive discretion is "the extent of legal flexibility to use government power by executive branch officials -power over personnel; budgets; information -giving coercive authority" (Cuellar, 2006, p.236) - where in reality "government actions are rarely purely discretionary, neither is discretion ever entirely absent...it is relative" (Cuellar, 2006, p. 37) . In corporate circles, discretion centrally features in the debates concerning agency and stewardship issues 6 (Berle & Means, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Donaldson & Davis,1991) and within Board accountability as governance and effectiveness (Hamza & Jarboui, 2016; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2013) . It also underpins the nature of individual leadership (Sheard et al., 2013) through periods of innovation (e.g. Apple) and crisis (e.g. Enron, Lehman's, BP,RBS).
Therefore, this paper focuses attention on the critical strategic leadership role of Company Secretary (Swabey, 2014) and its contributions to Board effectiveness (EY, 2016), which has -to date -received limited attention.
The remainder of this paper proceeds with a brief historical overview of the Company Secretary role. This is followed by a precis of the typical day-to-day tasks associated with the role, which varies according to the size of the organization. The methodology section outlines the engagement of third dimensional power (Lukes, 1974; 2005) The Company Secretary role has existed, in various forms, for over 5,000 years (see Table 1 below). The concept, as we know it today, first appeared in English Case Law reports in 1841 as a 'secretary of the society' and according to Hübner (1999, p. 461) (Dsouli et al., 2013; Spencer Stuart, 2011) . Furthermore, the Company Secretary role (Directors Briefing, 2015) and tasks vary not only as a factor of the size of organisation ( Table 2 below), but may also be influenced by the nature of the industry (e.g. energy, finance, tourism) or, more subtly, the background of the person in the role and/or the historical development of the role within the firm.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In the largest companies, the Company Secretary role is based on the company's statutory (formal) duties exemplified by the listed companies (FTSE 350) that are obliged to obey the statutory requirements (see Table 2 above). The Company Secretary may often also fulfil various additional functions/roles, such as being the 'General Counsel' and/or 'Governance
Officer'.
The range of the precise duties of the Company Secretary are less well-defined in statute, in comparison to other Board roles (McNulty & Stewart, 2015) . This may emerge more as historical significance of how the company has grown from small to becoming larger in size (Table 1 above) and/or through the ability of the Company Secretary themselves to negotiate their terms or position as 'Company Secretary'. These may "usually need to be set out in his/her contract of employment" (Morris et al., 2009, p. 223) . Bourne (1998, p. 221) suggests that "a daunting list of duties and responsibilities awaits the person who is appointed to the position". Thus, the boundaries of the role can vary considerably, as it embraces statutory, managerial, administration, and advisory/maintenance functions.
In the UK, the Company Code (CA 2006) renders the Company Secretary role mandatory for public companies (CA 2006, S271) . Hence, the role of the Company Secretary is a statutory requirement for public companies, and is highly integrated into the company's processes and procedures (Jackson, 2008; Knightley, 1931) . Company Secretary is "responsible for advising the board through the Chairman on all governance matters and for ensuring compliance with board procedures" (Hannigan, 2009, p.123, A.5.3) .
Methodology
This study is informed by 40 one-to-one semi-structured qualitative interviews (Creswell& Miller, 2000) Table 4 below). Going beyond the role, this qualitative inquiry identifies the characteristic influences that establish a capacity for power within the Company Secretary role.
The most appropriate guiding theory adopted is 'third dimensional' power (Lukes, 1974 (Lukes, , p. 2005 . This overcomes the limitations of -Role theory (Mead, 1934 ) that simplifies activities of actors to their social roles; Leadership or managerial discretionary theories (Finkelstein & Peteraf, 2007) that are constrained to economic/organisational perspectives and assumptions to their unit of analysis. Closer to reality, at the Board-level strategic decision-making is better holistically understood as a political process between individuals that, at the deeper level, emerges as a complex inter-play of power (Lukes, 2005) .
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
9 Company Secretaries' own views about themselves. 10 In total, there were 205 participants in the focus group sessions in addition to the 40 one-to-one interviews.
Several themes emerged from the interview narratives (Corbin & Strauss, 1990 ) that could be classified into three characteristics. These may, in unique combinations, influence the Company Secretary's level of contribution to Board effectiveness. Lukes' (2005) third dimension of power establishes the ways in which the powerful transform the powerless in such a way that the latter behave as the former wish -without coercion or forcible constraint.
Sometimes referred to as 'ideological power', this highlights the capacity of the Company Secretary in their ability to influence, or be influenced by, others.
Breadth and Majesty Findings
The interview and focus group transcription narratives were thematically analyzed and many traits of the Company Secretary emerged. These traits were then further iteratively classified into three major characteristics -Technical, Commercial and Social (see Table 5 below).
Extracted from the interview data-sets, Table 5 Table 5 below).
For each Company Secretary in their unique role and specific context, the particular combination of these three characteristics establishes the third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) 
Contributions to Board Effectiveness
These findings, with regard to the third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) 
Building Credibility with the Board
In each particular context, the Company Secretary's capacity can be understood to build credibility toward contributing to Board effectiveness. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Company Secretary is the main contact for all Board members, who may be internationally based. Furthermore, the Company Secretary is most likely to be the first person to know the up to date developments, as they sit in committee meetings, Board meetings and have access to information that is critical to shaping the pre-meetings and agendas. Thus, the role is ideally positioned to exercise third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) Considering Board effectiveness, different role interpretations reflect "boss, entrepreneurial and bureaucratic" qualities (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2000) to facilitate good decision-making, where power (Lukes, 2005) is distributed amongst the leadership roles. In reality, poor decision-making often reflects conditions where the CEO is boss. In contrast, the more effective alignment emerges where the CEO is entrepreneur; the NED is bureaucrat and the Chairman is boss (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2000) .
Where the other leadership roles often demonstrate more second face of power (Lukes, 1974; 2005) 11 i.e. using force in decision-making, the Company Secretary engages third dimensional power 12 (Lukes, 2005) , i.e. getting others to want the outcome you want, through co-opting them rather than coercing 13 them. In this regard, Board effectiveness emerges as a 11 At institutional level this maybe interpreted as Hard Power, e.g. see Nye, 2004 -as non-normative example. 12 At institutional level maybe interpreted as Soft Power e.g. see Nye, 1990 -as non-normative example. 13 Also evident at institutional level -see Dahl, 1961. balance between the second face and third level (Lukes, 2005) where the Company Secretary is strategically indispensable, giving attention to preference-setting and belief-shaping. Thus, this paper contributes as for the first time, Lukes' third dimensional power theory (Lukes, 2005) has been used in the context of corporate governance to understand the role of Company
Secretary and their discretionary capacity in this way. In addition, the paper adds to the discretionary, role, and leadership theories literatures at a deeper level.
Importantly, the role itself has evolved from being more an inward-focused role, to becoming much more outward-looking, where wider interactions with stakeholders such as investor relations, legal, strategic, media relations, and regulators in dealings of governance are an increasing part of the role. As such, the level of discretionary capacity of the role is critical to the contribution that can be made to business within society. can be used as a mechanism for building longer term discretionary capacity within the role or as a flexible, context-specific analytical framework. If the framework is adopted across the board, then the inter-play of this collegial body maybe better understood.
With regard to broader contributions, the future direction should be toward improving both role and Board effectiveness; for better understanding the characteristics needed within crisis/stable contexts; or within particular industry settings. In doing so, the focus should be on building leadership qualities for the longer term, where both role and discretionary capacity bring benefit to business and society. The combinations of improved governance and discretionary capacities should afford longer-term Board tenures and a greater effectiveness in dealing with a fuller spectrum of issues over time, as opposed to being simply specialists or experts.
Ultimately, top teams need a better shared understanding of the bigger picture in their decision-making processes. In this regard, the future trend may be toward the Company Secretary role becoming more equitably engaged with at Board level, as it is critical to the successful strategic contributions of an effective Board. The shift may force the Company Secretary to exercise greater second dimensional rather than third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) . Underpinning such potential developments depends on the nature of the governed marketplace and the preferred types of leadership that are promoted within it. 
